With the onset of the financial turmoil in August 2007, pricing 
Introduction
One of the key features of the current financial crisis is the confidence crisis it has involved in the money markets around the world. Whereas nobody questioned the access to market in both secured and unsecured segments before August 2007, uncertainties about financial soundness of credit institutions have rapidly made market participants realising that access to market liquidity could not be given for granted. Through growing use of scoring by banks, and given the importance of bilateral trade in the money market, trading in the money market in general, in the unsecured segments in particular, have reduced in total volume and narrowed to smaller groups of institutions depending on the maturity of the trade. However, the LIBOR (or Euribor)-OIS spread has been used since the beginning of the money market turmoil, as the main yardstick to illustrate the funding stress staged by commercial banks. The early stage of the crisis triggered upward pressures on interest rates across all segments of the unsecured money market. The surge in the overnight interest rates observed at the beginning of August 2007 has triggered early action by central banks that have rapidly permitted to tame the shorter end of the curve, and to put the overnight rates back in line with key rates. Since then overnight rates, albeit more volatile, have remained broadly under control, thanks to the compelling actions of central banks that have accommodated the surge in the demand for reserves at the end of maintenance periods while limiting the downward pressure on rates later in the maintenance period. This pro-active liquidity management by central banks has permitted to stabilize the short-end of the market, and as a consequence, the expectations of stable short-term rates going forward. These stable expectations explain why EONIA term swap rates have since then remained relatively unaffected by the turmoil, and adjusted swiftly to the monetary policy adjustments observed in the US and the UK. Conversely, Euribor and LIBOR rates for G10 currencies have been more volatile, and staged upward pressures that have only temporarily receded markedly following central banks' unconditional commitment to provide unlimited liquidity across maturities. 
Source: Reuters and authors' calculation
Initially seen aimed at stabilizing the short-end of the money market, central bank actions have been more and more openly geared towards stabilizing conditions in the term money market. The ECB has gradually re-balanced its liquidity provision towards longer-term refinancing operations up to one year tenor 5 , the Bank of England has increased the size of its long-term repo, and the Fed, via the TAF and the TSLF and other facilities has tried to help commercial banks to re-channel some liquidity towards the money market, through the exchange of highly liquid assets for assets whose refinancing access to the market had been closed.
Central banks have thus gradually changed their stance and tried to impact not only the shorter-end of the curve, as they do traditionally, but also term rates so as to re-establish a "normal functioning of the money market". Some studies have tried to analyze the impact of central banks' operations on some indicators of market liquidity stress, and notably on the LIBOR/OIS spread. Keister and McAndrews (2009) analyse the large quantity of reserves implied by the new liquidity facilities created by the Federal Reserve and discuss their potential effects on bank lending and the level of the economy. Taylor and Williams (2008) contend that the Fed operations (the Term Auction Facility) do not have an effect on this indicator of liquidity stress. The IMF (2008), using different empirical techniques (GARCH and Markow-Switching regime), conclude that central banks managed to reduce the market stress. Michaud and Upper (2008) , after studying the drivers of LIBOR rates' movements during the turmoil suggest that central banks' operations were instrumental in the cooling-off of the LIBOR/OIS spread. Gyntelberg and Wooldridge (2008) , study the detailed modalities of money market fixings.
They highlighted the potential biases related to participants' strategic behaviour, but conclude 5 It is noticed that the 3-month, 6-month and one-year LTROs represent now around 90% of the ECB liquidity and the one-week operation, MRO, only 10%.
that fixings had worked well in a context of market dislocation, and that the dispersion within the dataset used to determine the references was a consequence of the market turmoil, and not a symptom of a flawed fixing process. They argued that the safeguards used to avert the risks of gaming of the index (trimming of the extremes) worked well in this context.
Although it can be easily argued that higher dispersion in quotes among surveyed banks and more volatile term spreads are normal features in crisis periods due to the prevailing uncertainties, the key issue is to know whether these crisis phenomena are also reflecting higher distortions in the market dynamics, in particular in the usual strong relationship existing between the unsecured and the key pricing reference of the money market, i.e. the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve. This is the main issue and it also constitutes its original contribution to the literature. Indeed, to our best knowledge, this issue has been only partly addressed by practitioners but it has not yet been treated in an analytical framework allowing robustness tests.
This paper is structured as follows. Following the introduction, Section 2 overviews briefly the evolution of banks' funding in recent decades. Section 3 recalls the essence of the pricing relationship between instruments in the unsecured segments of the money market. Section 4 describes the data while Section 5 presents the dynamics of these segments prior to and during the two steps of the financial crisis (i.e. from August 2007 but prior to the collapse of Lehman and afterwards). Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Conceptual framework

Definition
The trading on the unsecured deposit market is the oldest form of interest rate trading. It is a decentralised and over-the-counter (OTC) market segment. A by-product of the trading on the deposit market is the LIBOR index calculated and published by the British Banking Association (BBA) since 1986. With the start of the euro in January 1999, the EURIBOR index calculated by the European Banking Federation, taking the succession of the continental European counterparts of the BBA, gained importance and quickly became the primary benchmark in the euro money market, while the predominance of the BBA-issued LIBORs remained undisputed for other currencies.
Libor (since 1986) and Euribor (since 1999) fixing rates are declarative reference used to provide a benchmark reference on term funding conditions for financial contracts (retail loans, wholesale banking activities, syndicated loans) but also OTC financial derivatives (Forward Rate Agreements (FRAs), short and long-term swaps, swaptions) and exchangetraded financial derivatives (future contracts, and options on those future contracts). A full description of the Libor-type fixings is featured in Gyntelberg and Wooldridge (2008) .
However, given the purpose of this paper, it is worth highlighting the key features of this process and outlining the differences with other types of money market references (in particular actually traded indexes).
The calculation and definition of these indexes (as their composition) is presented in Annex I.
These benchmarks have a key role far beyond cash markets as they serve as pricing reference for the above mentioned financial derivative instruments, among which, most importantly, the futures contracts of the LIFFE on the EURIBOR and LIBOR (the London International Financial Futures and options Exchange). Through the use of these futures contracts, LIFFE market's participants hedge their cash market exposure, speculate upon the future direction of interest rate and run arbitrage strategies across market segments. In the long run at least, it is absolutely necessary to have enough activity in the deposit market to ensure correct pricing of the future contract, which requires the anchoring of the fixing to its notional underlying, and to avoid long-lasting disturbances in pricing dynamics. In essence the cash deposit market should be liquid enough to allow arbitragers to ensure on ongoing basis price parity between the contract and its cash equivalent. 6 In the case of the EURIBOR, futures contract is currently the primary hedge tool for nearly all short-termed interest-rates financial instruments. On other currencies, future contracts with a similar design play the same role of primary hedge tool.
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Against this background, it appears crucial that a reasonable level of trading is maintained on the deposit market. Recent experience shows that, in a context of confidence crisis, liquidity may dry up on the term deposit market segment, which serves as a basis for the LIBOR/EURIBOR index calculation. Persistent and severe discontinuation of trading on the deposit market have the ability to erode, over time, the incentives or the ability for market participants to price correctly the fixings, hence implying that the EURIBOR index could loose its "physical" anchoring to the underlying market and become more a notional reference. In such circumstances, the main risk would be twofold. First, as a growing number of retail interest rates in the banking system are indexed on these fixings, any mispricing would automatically be translated in to interest rates applied to the real economy. Second, there is a risk that a sudden stop in trading the EURIBOR futures contract itself could occur, mainly because the arbitrage relationship with the cash market would be broken, which would 6 In the case of the Euribor this arbitrage is only feasible upon settlement of the contract, once a quarter for the 3-months future. At this juncture, arbitragers are able to benefit from any price discrepancy between the chain of future contract prices, and their cash equivalent Future Rate Agreements. These "cash" FRAs can be replicated by a set of simple deposit operations: for instance the 3X3 FRA, i.e. the right to lend over 3 months in 3 months, is simply replicated by the juxtaposition of a 6 month borrowing and a 3 month loan with matching value dates. Arbitrage should kick-in (in principle) whenever future contract implied rate differ too markedly from these "cash" FRA rates. Arbitrager will buy the "mispriced" future and sell the other contract, and pocket the difference upon settlement. 7 In the case of Germany, the Frankfurt-based FIBOR was shadowed by its London counterpart, the German Mark LIBOR.
de facto makes the futures un-hedgeable. In effect, as the fixing would be disanchored from its notional underlying, then also the derivatives cash-settled on that fixing would be subject to a disanchored evolution. The fact that the fixing, even in case it would loose its "physical" significance, would still influence related market because of the existing outstanding debt which is fixing-indexed.
Although the last possible development does not seem to have started yet as the trading volumes of the futures contract remain high since the beginning of the turmoil, it is important to question whether the fixings in the unsecured market have been distorted. In this respect, it is worth noticing that the recent strong decreases in the spreads between the Interbank Offered Rate (BOR) and the Overnight Index Swaps (OIS) have occurred in spite of any clear dearth of market activity in the unsecured money market, where turnover has remained pretty low in most currencies as described later on.
By contrast, actually traded money market benchmarks (EONIA, SONIA, Fed Fund effective) are benchmark references based on overnight rate operations only. Instead of being declarative, these references are based on actually traded volumes reported by panel banks to a calculating agent (the European Banking Federation (EBF) for which the ECB is calculating the EONIA, wire services for the Sonia and the Fed Fund). Each bank report by the end of the business day the amount and the volume weighted average rate of its realised overnight operation. There is no trimming, as the influence of outliers is -generally -reduced by the volume-weighting scheme. In addition, the risk of strategic or opportunistic behaviour of contributing banks is considerably reduced as banks have to report actually traded levels.
Furthermore, individual contributions are kept anonymous, so that no signalling issues (e.g. banks borrowing higher than the posted average) arise via the index publication.
Historical perspective
In order to understand the current importance of the unsecured fixings of the money market, it appears essential to briefly review the roots of their evolution. In the 1980s and early 1990s commercial banks had a central role in financial systems, and played a re-distribution function, mainly reflecting the fact that they had a quasi monopoly in the collection of Funds did not necessarily found their way to the broader market, as the segmentation was high between the traditional "peer-to-peer" interbank markets and other financial institutions.
Likewise security issuance as a funding instrument was less important and asset-base repo operations were used only anecdotally in the interbank market by trading desks to cover their 
Source: ECB (2009)
Second, the emphasis put on capital adequacy over the last 15 years has shortened the potential horizon of interbank operations, as treasurers appeared increasingly reluctant to support the regulatory capital intensity of term interbank unsecured borrowing. Since treasurers reduced the term of their interbank loans (while still willing to borrow at longer term maturity), they set into motion a self-fulfilling mechanism of gradual hollowing of the tenors beyond one-month, making it impossible to raise significant amounts for longer terms.
As In sum, it can be said that the evolution of the interbank trading has led to three key features of the current state of the money market: (i) interbank operations in a narrow sense ("peer-topeer") now represent a much smaller share of banks' market-related funding than in the past;
(ii) banks' market funding now is more reliant on banks' access to the repo market, securitized funding, or on how they raise funds with non-banking entities (money market funds, insurance companies and pension funds via repos); and (iii) as a related matter, LIBOR/EURIBOR operations represent now only a remote "proxy" of their overall funding costs.
A bird's eye of the interplay between cash and derivative pricing: the role of arbitrage
The price of LIBOR and EURIBOR-indexed short-term derivative instruments are directly related to their corresponding fixing rates. Fixings are used for the settlement and reset of these derivatives contracts, so they should provide a very sound basis for comparison ("comparing apples with apples"). These contracts are derivatives products involving no cash transfer (but the profit & loss upon settlement). For this reason they bear little or no credit risk, and should not be affected by idiosyncratic factors like the creditworthiness of the market-maker or of the counterpart, implying no sampling considerations. Last but not least, prices are extremely homogeneous (consequence of the former point) and generally lay within one or two basis points for the trading community as a whole. For this reason, short-term derivative prices can be seen as an unbiased indicator of the tensions that have affected the money market overall since the onset of the turmoil.
There is one more reason why short-term derivative prices give a more adequate view of how liquidity tensions have actually disrupted the money market. Indeed, other indicators are somehow flawed because they do not provide a clear reference value, or anchor, to analyze how disrupted markets were. They can be affected by both credit worries and the overall degree of liquidity stress but disentangling these two effects is analytically very difficult.
Furthermore, it is impossible to know which level, going forward, would represent a "normal level" once liquidity tensions will have abated 10 . By contrast, analyzing the efficiency of spotforward arbitrage operations between the cash fixing and BOR-indexed derivatives should
give a very precise and objective character to this debate as the pricing parity should be rigorously observed at all times in a cruise speed environment (thus providing for this "anchor").
Forward rate agreements (FRAs) are interest rate risk instruments traded on the OTC market by counterparts willing to hedge interest rate risk, speculators willing to take exposure on interest rate movements and arbitrageurs whose operations are meant to benefit from inconsistency between prices of instruments offering similar characteristics. FRAs are straightforward instruments whose trading started with the development of modern money markets. Trading of these instruments developed rapidly on account of their potential for leveraging (the exposure is notional but there is no need to immobilize cash), the cash settlement, but also the fact that it relates to popular indexes used for the indexation of most commercial bankers assets and liabilities. FRAs also became extremely popular instruments for liquidity managers, as they allowed the building-up of interest rate exposures with little regulatory capital consumption and liquidity risks.
The FRA/LIBOR fixing pricing parity
FRAs and other short-term derivatives (interest rate swaps, future contracts) are risk management instruments mostly based on the corresponding BOR curve, so, in the case of the euro, on the EURIBOR cash curve. Although they are cash settled (these products require no settlement of the notional amount of the contract), they have a very tight relationship with the cash curve. Based on the working assumption that any market participant can borrow/lend freely at the fixing rate published daily, there ought to be a strong pricing parity between the cash curve (the master curve) and the yield curves of the related instruments. To give a trivial example, the 3X6 FRA quotations 11 should be coherent with corresponding 3-month and 6-month LIBOR as simultaneously borrowing for 6 months and lending for 3 months creates a forward exposure whose break-even rates can be calculated from the two former rates (borrower for 3 months in three months). This spot-forward pricing parity used to hold because market participants, in normal times (i.e. whenever access to unsecured lending and 10 There is an ongoing debate on where the LIBOR-OIS could settle once back into a "cruise speed environment". Some banks see a spread around 30 basis points as a possible anchor going forward. It is worth remembering that this spread had remained below 10 basis points for several years during the 90's and at the turn of the century, highlighting that the "underpricing" of the cost of liquidity was a well-entrenched phenomenon in the last 10 years. 11 The quotation conventions read as follow: a 3X6 FRA represents the right to purchase or sell a 3-month deposit with a starting date in 3 months. A 6X9 FRA is for a 3-month deposit in 6 months, and so on.
borrowing is unlimited), arbitrage out any difference that would arise between FRA prices and their "theoretical fair value" derived from the cash fixing curve.
Thus, the pricing of FRAs assumes an arbitrage relationship between spot rates and forward rates. The FRA theoretical rate for the forward period t 2 can be calculated as a function of the spot rates Y for the terms and t 1 and T (nd T = nd t1 + nd t2 ), as it should be equivalent to lend or borrow for the period T, or to roll-over a loan/borrowing over the periods t 1 and t 2 . This pricing relationship can be noted as follows, for the case of a currency with daycount actual/360, such as the USD or the EUR:
The FRA theoretical rate is thus: 
The standard spot-forward arbitrage parity described above is used below to derive from the actually traded FRA chain rates a notional cash fixing curve. Instead of applying this pricing parity to one single FRA rate, one assumes, if arbitrage holds true, that a long-term cash fixing rate should be priced consistently with the underlying chain of FRA prices. In order to check this assumption, one re-composes the "implied fixing rates" underlying FRAs' pricing by using the FRA chains. The stub rate is the first cash rate that will bridge the gap with the first FRA forward date: 
Once calculated this LIBOR implied rate for the period T, one can compare it with the actual fixing rate that was published on that day. The difference between the two is here referred to ε . This spread, which is essentially a reflection of transactions costs in a normal environment, is easy to calculate for most major currencies and for various pairs of term, e.g. on the 3-months and 6-months, or on the 6 months and one year BOR terms:
Historical data show that this pricing parity, once accounted for the small deviations between fair value and actually traded prices that related to transactions costs, or specific episodes (e.g. 
The Information content of the spread implicit vs. actual fixings
What is the analytical value of this spread between BOR-indexed derivatives implied fixing curves and the actual fixing curve? This spread between theoretical and actual fixing represents market makers' assessment of the cost of physically hedging the exposure (say borrowing 6 months and lending three months as in the example used above), would this exposure need to be hedged upfront or closed. In that sense it is a pure reflection of the liquidity risk faced when hedging physically a derivative position for an interbank counterpart. For this reason, this spread should increase with the overall degree of liquidity stress but also with the length of the resets on the contract. Thus, a contract with overnight resets (e.g. OIS) will be deemed less "liquidity risk exposed" than a contract embedding 3-or 6-months resets, as physical hedging in the former case will require raising cash respectively for 3 and 6 months. This does explain why BOR-related derivative curve tends to show higher spreads towards the fixing curve when they embed longer resetting period. The value of this approach is that it offers somehow an unbiased measure of this "execution cost" (i.e. cost required to replicate physically the exposure achieved through BOR-related derivatives) that is a good proxy of the degree of disruption that plagued the money market.
The existence and the magnitude of this spread suggest that fixings do not only reflect funding pressure experienced by banks. It also highlights that arbitrageurs were not in a position to enter the market and take advantage of this differential, simply because like most market participants, they fell short of the type of market access 12 that would have been necessary to exploit this arbitrage opportunity. Looking backward, the ease at which the implicit cash curve shifted from the actual fixing curve is easy to understand. For years arbitrageurs had ceased to be active on the spot-forward segment of the BOR indices. Instead they had shifted their focus towards placing spread bets on various segments of the money market yield curves. Anecdotal reports suggest that this spot-forward pricing relationship was extremely traded between EURIBOR-based derivatives and OIS swaps. FRAs and BOR swaps were traded against OIS used as a proxy for cash. 13 Money market spreads were anchored because of the widespread belief that OIS represented the rate at which term funding was deemed to be routinely available.
12 This means that counterparts willing to lend to them at the fixing rate. 13 Instead of a pure pricing parity, arbitrageurs traded the assumption that BOR should be at least 5 to 6 basis points above OIS rates, because OIS references are actual traded rates (bid or ask depending on which counterpart took the initiative of the trade, and henceforth statistically mid-rates), while the BORs were meant to be an offered rate First, as previously shown by Figure 1 , the price for the unsecured transaction in the various currencies has broadly followed the same decreasing trend since October 2008. While this decreasing trend has occurred in the wake of the intensification of liquidity provision by central banks, at the same time some indicators suggests that the activity in the unsecured market has remained rather limited or has not sufficiently rebounded to explain such decreases.
14 As there are so many notional BOR curves as types and frequency of resets, the abovementioned epsilon, ε, should be represented by a surface instead of a curve, as shown in Figure 7 . The reason is that notional BOR curves with low frequency reset and longer resetting periods are the closest to the fixing curve. By contrast, notional curve with high frequency resets (say one month, because this is the shorter derivative reset possible before OIS instruments whose reset frequency is overnight) and shortterm resetting period are the closest to the OIS curve. For each fixing of the four main families at the 3-month maturity, and for every day, we construct the difference between individual banks contributions and the final published value of that fixing, and then take the standard deviation over banks which measures the dispersion of the contributions of those banks to a particular fixing. For each of the four families of fixings, we aggregate over maturities by taking the median. We hence obtain four indicators that measures the dispersion of bank's contribution irrespective of the maturity of the fixing.
To those four indicators pertaining to the EURIBOR and to the three LIBORs, we add a general indicator pertaining to the four families, also using the median. In practice, these indicators of dispersion can be interpreted as follows. As long as the underlying market of a particular fixing is active, then the banks have the possibility to contribute by their estimation of the market rate of that existing market. They have all sort of incentives, among which the reputation, to effectively behave so, reflecting that, as they are chosen among the major players of that market, they should be effectively in a better position to correctly gauge the market. As it follows, they all contribute accurate estimates of a same figure, and therefore the dispersion is low. Conversely, if the dispersion is high, it follows that the market does not follow the "law of one price", sparking questions about the nature of the underlying market and a potential dis-anchoring. The results are reported in Figure 9 .
According to Figure 9 , the dispersion indicators display a similar pattern over time. With the onset of the financial turmoil on 9 August 2007, dispersion almost triples for all currencies.
Then there is a slow, but incomplete, reversal to lower values, until the collapse of Lehman Brothers, where dispersion about triples again. Two weeks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, one has observed the sudden stop of activity in the money markets, which has led the dispersion to triple further. Since then, there is a very slow reversal trend that brings the dispersion at 8 or 10 times the value observed before the turmoil. 
Source: Reuters and authors' calculation
For space reason, the remainder of the paper is focused on the euro area data at 3-month maturity collected from Reuters. In order to allow using appropriate techniques 5which requires long data set), the first part of the empirical analysis is based on the daily observations for the 3-month deposit interest rate and the 3-month overnight index swap (OIS) collected from Reuters. The second part of the empirical analysis is based on the interbank offered rates and the EONIA fixings in EUR, also provided by Reuters (see Annex I). substantially from the Libor at times of liquidity stress. 18 The limitation of these alternative measures is that they are affected by some idiosyncratic factors that limit the bearing of this type of analogy. Belton et al. (2008) also expressed reservations on the accuracy of these yardsticks, highlighting the impact of the time difference, and also the different sampling (H15 banks, or banks quoting the FX swaps represent a much broader and heterogeneous sample than Libor panel banks), cautioning against a premature "too low Libor" conclusion.
Later on, similar doubts were expressed, although not based on proper empirical analysis but rather on anecdotal evidence. However, these criticisms made by practitioners have not yet been formally analysed with an econometric framework allowing various robustness tests, which is the main purpose of this paper.
In order to contribute to the debate, the empirical part of this paper aims at analysing the market dynamics between unsecured (deposit/EURIBOR) and the secured (OIS/EONIA fixing) segments of the euro area money market. As said previously, given the natural arbitrage between the various segments in the money markets, there is no compelling reason in theory which could explain that the unsecured rates or fixings diverge significantly from the OIS rate at any point in time. This intuition is necessarily related to the existence of arbitrage in financial markets, which is turn occurs when markets are functioning properly.
Dynamics of the time series
The first natural technique to test possible divergence in the expected strong relationship between the 3-month EURIBOR and the EONIA swap index is to look at their co-movement.
In particular, it is expected that, by arbitrage, any movement in one particular time series 17 It is worth noting that there also exists a LIBOR in euro provided by the British Banking Association (BBA) and based on panel banks which are not necessarily those of the panel banks surveyed by the EBF, which is also reported in Figure XXX Chadha and Durré, 2009 ).
should be shortly followed by a similar movement in the other time series and vice-versa. Put it differently, there should exist between these two variables a strong and stable relationship in the long run, assuming efficient functioning of the money market.
Implicitly referring to the cointegration technique, we suggest here to proceed in two steps.
First, displaying both the same stochastic process of order I (1) 19 , we test whether both times series has a relationship of the type (1,-1) where their joint variation is equal to a constant.
Second, we check whether this relationship may have changed across sub-samples distinguishing the pre-and the turmoil periods.
For this purpose, we first use the daily data for the 3-month (unsecured) deposit rate and the (1) is estimated using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimators following Newey-West (1987) . The results are reported in Table 2 . Not surprisingly, in the pre-turmoil sample, the parameters of equation (1) display the expected values. The spread between the 3-month deposit rate and the 3-month OIS, given in Table 1 by the valueα , is significantly different from zero and positive, amounting 4.4 basis points on average over this sample. In the same vein, the null hypothesis according to which the parameter β is significantly equal to 1 cannot be rejected. In addition, this estimation displays a very good fit as the adjusted R 2 is close to 1.
By contrast, the estimation results deteriorate substantially for the two sub-samples covering the turmoil period. For the pre-Lehman sample, although the null hypothesis 1 = β cannot be rejected, the value of the spread does not appear significantly different from zero. Moreover, the fit of the estimation decreases dramatically to 47% of explanatory power with respect to the data. Similarly, the results for the post-Lehman sample are mixed. While the explanatory power of equation (1) increases to 95% over this period, the null hypothesis that the parameter β is significantly equal to 1 is strongly rejected. However, the spread, which rises to 49 basis points, appears significantly different from zero.
In sum, for the turmoil sample, equation (1) appears insufficient to explain the dynamics between both financial instruments. Put it simply, it could be argued accordingly that an omitted variable has gained in importance during the turmoil period whereas insignificant before the turmoil. In order to investigate this intuition, equation (1) is modified for the turmoil sample by including a deterministic trend. While adding a deterministic trend seems somewhat a-theoretical in this particular context, the purpose of this exercise is to check whether a regular pattern in the fluctuations of the deposit rate may be found. If yes, this could be the sign of a convergence among the quotes of market participants as regards their direction independently of the fluctuations of the OIS. The results are reported in Tables 3   and 4. For the first sub-sample of the turmoil period, i.e. the pre-Lehman phase, the inclusion of the deterministic trend increases somewhat the explanatory power 20 of equation (1) while this trend appears significantly different zero at 5% significance. By contrast, the existence of a 20 The adjusted R 2 increases by 3.4% up to 50.7% instead of 47.3%.
time-invariant spread is strongly rejected, which could be explained by the presence of a timevarying spread over the period under review. More interesting are the results reported in Table 4 for the post-Lehman turmoil period. First, both the null hypothesis that α=0 and t=0 is strongly rejected. Second, the inclusion of a deterministic trend as explanatory variable improves by around 2% (up to 97%) the explanatory power of equation (1). Last but not least, when comparing with the results reported in Table 1 , it is interesting to note that the inclusion of the deterministic trend allows not to reject the null hypothesis of the Wald test according to which β=1, which is strongly rejected in the absence of the deterministic trend. This last result thus suggests that the deterministic trend, which amounts to a daily decrease of 0.5 basis points on average over the sample period, is necessary to reconcile the dynamics of the 3-month deposit rate with its corresponding OIS. As a robustness check, one verifies that something has effectively changed as regards the mutual influence that both financial instruments are expected to have on each other. For this purpose, one performs a Granger-causality test for all the sample periods. The results are reported in Table 5 below. The results reported in Table 5 can be summarised as follows. In the first sample, a strong explicit relationship between the 3-month deposit interest rate and the 3-month swap index seems to hold, whatever the direction. In this sample, the 3-month deposit interest rate does statistically influence the 3-month swap index and vice-versa. This seems to be also the case in the turmoil sample prior to the collapse of Lehman, although a less strongly. By contrast, the picture changes in the turmoil sample post-Lehman. In fact, although the null hypothesis H 0 is still statistically rejected, it appears not to be the case for the null hypothesis H 0 bis, which assumes that the 3-month deposit interest rate does not (Granger-) cause the 3-month swap index whereas the opposite is statistically true. Moreover, it is also important to underline that the results of these tests appear to be independent of the lags number, hence increasing the robustness of the Granger-Causality test.
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In sum, the results in Table 5 thus confirm a breakdown in the relationship between the 3-month deposit rate and the 3-month OIS in the turmoil period post-Lehman. In combination with the results reported in Table 4 , it seems that the direction of the regular pattern in the 3-month deposit rate (characterised by the presence of a deterministic trend) is unilaterally affected by the direction of the 3-month OIS index. This last finding implies that the expected 21 Note that a standard cointegration analysis also provides similar results. However, Johansen-type findings are not reported here for three reasons. First, given the purpose of the analysis, it is better not to constraint the analysis by imposing the cointegrating relationship. Second, an appropriate standard cointegration analysis would require a longer sample. Third, the main interest of the discussion in the paper is to look at the steady equilibrium relationship between the two interest rate variables, which is better summed up by the OLSQ specification based on Newey and West (1987) .
arbitrage between both segments of the money market is not working during the turmoil period.
Statistical evidence
In order to perform a robustness check of the previous findings, it appears interesting to check whether the apparent disconnection between the unsecured and the secured segments of the euro area money market (when using the quotes) is also reflected in the corresponding fixings. Indeed, in the early stage of the crisis, some have argued that the fixings for the unsecured segments were note correctly reflecting the developments of the corresponding quotes (i.e. the deposit rates). Against this background, it appears appropriate to analyse also the relationship between the EURIBOR and EONIA fixings both at the 3-month horizon. 
EONIA Swap Index EURIBOR
Source: Reuters and authors' calculations
These two previous elements, i.e. the asymmetry of the EURIBOR distribution and most importantly, the extreme steadiness of the daily declines, appear very unlikely from a statistical viewpoint. 22 Intuitively, such a concentration of occurrences could only be explained by a general decrease in the dispersion of comparable money market rates. In fact, in comparison with the development observed for the EONIA fixing (reflected by a larger histogram close to normal distribution), the dispersion for the EURIBOR appears tremendously concentrated (i.e. stable).
In light of Figure A .1 in Annex II, one observes that the distribution of EONIA swap changes on those 76 days is similar to its distribution on the total sample of 191 days, with its standard deviation remaining of the same order of magnitude. Put it differently, the steady behaviour of the EURIBOR on those days cannot be attributed to a calmer period for interest rate fluctuations since developments in the EONIA swap series suggest that short term interest rates have staged a usual level of volatility on these days.
When taking the previous probability density as a benchmark for a normal behaviour of the 3-month EURIBOR fixing and assuming that daily fixing returns are independently distributed 22 This apparent steadiness of the declines is reinforced when restricting the histogram presented in Figure 3 to a decrease of the EURIBOR comprised between half a basis point and one and a half a basis point (i.e. to only 76 occurrences, circa 40% of the days in the turmoil period whereas such decrease has a frequency of occurrence of 11% over the pre-turmoil period from 1999 to 2007). Figure  A .1 in Annex II shows that this histogram of the EURIBOR is then reduced to two central columns representing decreases comprised between 1.5-1 basis points and 1-0.5 basis point whereas the distribution of the daily returns for the 3-month EONIA fixing remain wide.
and follow a discrete binomial process, a probability based on a binomial distribution process can be calculated as follows (by using n for the number of consecutive trials, p for the probability of a positive outcome, and k the number of positive outcome): 
The previous probability thus suggests that the probability of such depreciation outcome over a very short period of time, based on the pre-turmoil statistical properties of the EURIBOR fixing time series, is pretty low, that is close to zero. This statistical finding thus confirms the econometric results for the deposit and swap rates, both suggesting that the EURBOR fixing rates have followed over the recent turmoil period an extremely unusual steady downward pace (i.e. a deterministic pace rather than the usually "stochastic" diffusion process), irrespectively of the average volatility observed on neighbouring market segment.
The previous findings may imply, among other things, that the fixing could be the result of converging pricing among prime banks not entirely reflecting market conditions, hence making the fixing entirely virtual. By nature, if it is so for the EURIBOR, then it is quite likely that the USD and GBP counterpart, which are the 3-month LIBOR, also have a somewhat virtual nature. In the same vein, if the fixings of 3-month interest rates appear artificial, there is no compelling reason why this should not also be the case for the fixing of longer maturities and in particular for the 1-year fixings, clearly putting at risk the anchoring role of these fixings in the financial markets.
Finally, one may wonder whether such "virtual pricing" of the EURIBOR may result mainly from euro area continental banks in the EBF panel or whether it also applies to non euro area international banks. To answer that question, a synthetic LIBOR index for EUR(named LiborUK-LIBOR) is calculated on the basis of the various contributions which only includes BBA's panel banks which do not contribute to the EURIBOR fixing made by EBF. Figure 14 below reports the comparison of this synthetic index with both the LIBOR fixing for the EUR segment and the EURIBOR, both for the 3-month maturity. Interestingly, it can be noted that the dispersion of the pricing made between by international (mostly London-based) banks with respect to the pricing made by euro area banks in the EURIBOR panel has increased significantly since the beginning of 2009. When combining this information with the previous statistical evidence, it appears that the regular daily decrease of between 0.5 and 1.5 basis points seems to mostly reflect a "convergence of views" within the euro area banks. Granger-causality tests suggest that the direction of deposit rates and fixings were set univocally by the OIS, while an omitted variable seem to have gotten into get into play. In particular, it appears that the addition of a deterministic trend into the regression model during the post-Lehman period helps find again the co-movement expected these two financial instruments. Put it simply, the added deterministic trend support both the re-connection of the two series and the one-way sided nature of their relationship post-Lehman. Finally, a probability-based analysis using a binomial law supports the former finding that something "deeply unusual" happened on Euribor fixings post-Lehman. The economic meaning of such deterministic trend is not easy as it could reflect various phenomena, epitomizing for instance a hypothetical coordination between individual fixing contributors.
These findings raise some questions. Although the issue of the quality and the accuracy of money market fixings may be deemed not central for monetary policy-making, it might affect the transmission channels of monetary policy, if prolonged over an extended period of time.
Indeed, given the anchoring role played unsecured segment fixings in the money and capital markets (including retail banks' interest rates to the economy), the risk of opportunistic behaviour tainting the production of market references should be avoided. Likewise, the issues related to the lack of depth of the unsecured money market on the term, and of the related consequences in terms of accuracy of the fixings, should also be addressed.
Practically a discussion on the production of fixings rates should aim at overcoming the following issues. First, fixing procedures should reflect better commercial banks' liability mix and the growing role of NBFIs, and overcome the outdated "peer-to-peer" approach that inspired fixing procedures at their inception. Second the governance of fixings should be more active, and involve frequent due diligence to avoid opportunistic behaviours and other dis-anchoring. This may lead in practice to a broadening of the financing base underlying fixings by including CDs, tripartite repos operations on non-government collateral (down to investment grade), and any other funding operations that represent a de facto proxy of an unsecured funding operation.
Another challenge could be to revive the unsecured money market through a less asymmetric supervisory framework. Indeed the crisis has shown that a too tight regulatory capital approach towards unsecured operations seem to have generated an adverse selection 
ANNEX I Definition and composition of the LIBOR/EURIBOR
The unsecured interest rates used in the note are of two types. On the one hand, unsecured interest rates are presented on the basis of the LIBOR. On the other hand, the EURIBOR interest rates are used. The purpose of both types is similar, only the panel of surveyed banks differs.
Strictly, the LIBOR is defined as: " In practice, this is the rate at which each bank submits must be formed from that bank's perception of its cost of funds in the interbank market. In addition, it is specified that contributions must represent rates formed in London and not elsewhere and for the currency concerned. They should not be the cost of producing one currency by borrowing in another currency and accessing the required currency via the foreign exchange markets. The rates must be submitted by members of staff at a bank with primary responsibility for management of a bank's cash, rather than a bank's derivative book.
On the British Bankers' Association (BBA) website 23 , it is also recalled that the key concept is that LIBOR is based upon the offered rate, and not the bid rate. Every contributor bank is asked to base their bbalibor submissions on the following question; "At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?" Therefore, submissions are based upon the lowest perceived rate that a bank on a certain currency panel could go into the inter-bank money market and obtain sizable funding, for a given maturity.
The rates are not based on actual transaction, indeed it would not be possible to create the suite of bbalibor rates if this was a requirement, as not all banks will require funds in marketable size each day in each of the currencies and maturities they quote. However, this does not mean the rates do not reflect true cost of interbank funding. A bank will know what its credit and liquidity risk profile is from rates at which it has dealt, and can construct a curve to predict accurately the correct rate for currencies or maturities in which it has not been active.
"Reasonable market size" is intentionally left loosely defined. This is because it would have to be constantly monitored, and in the current conditions it would have to be changed almost It is a trimmed average of inter-bank deposit rates offered by designated contributor banks, for maturities ranging from overnight to one year. LIBOR is calculated for 10 currencies.
There are either eight, twelve or sixteen contributor banks on each currency panel and the reported interest is the mean of the middle values (the interquartile mean).
Similarly, the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (or EURIBOR) is a daily reference rate based on the averaged interest rates at which banks offer to lend unsecured funds to other banks in the the reference rate on Reuters pages 248-249, which will be made available to all its subscribers and to other data vendors. The published rate is a rounded, truncated mean of the quoted rates: the highest and lowest 15% of quotes are eliminated, the remainder are averaged and the result is rounded to 3 decimal places. Euribor rates are spot rates, i.e. for a start two working days after measurement day. Like US money-market rates, they are Actual/360, i.e.
calculated with an exact daycount over a 360-day year. 24 For GBP money market rates, they are Actual/365.
24 http://www.euribor.org/html/content/euribor_tech.html. 
